Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
AUG 27 1980
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

80-302

No.

IN THE

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

---

**EDWARD ANDREW KIMPEL, III,**

*Petitioner,*

vs.

**PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,**

*Respondent.*

---

## PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT

---

FREDERICK F. COHN
CAROLINE JAFFE
35 East Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 641-0692
*Attorneys for Petitioner*

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60601, Financial 6-3988

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Is an indigent's right to counsel on appeal fulfilled—and is there compliance with the constitutional mandate of *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738—where appointed appellate counsel simply files an inept brief merely attacking the propriety of the sentence, files no reply brief, and waives oral argument, without either filing an *Anders* brief or raising any issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for murder or the fairness of the procedures resulting in conviction?

2. Was petitioner deprived of due process of law at his sentencing hearing, where the trial court considered psychological reports 18 to 21 years old, absent any indication of the qualifications or expertise of their preparers, and despite petitioner's arguments to the sentencing court that the reports were inaccurate and hearsay, that they were too ancient to be relevant, and that they contained privileged material, revelation of which violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?

## TABLE OF CONTENTS


| | PAGE |
|---|---|
| Opinion Below | 2 |
| Jurisdictional Statement | 2 |
| Constitutional Provisions Involved | 3 |
| Statement Of The Case | 3 |
| Raising The Federal Questions Below | 6 |
| Reasons For Granting The Writ: | |
| 1. An indigent's right to counsel on appeal is not fulfilled—and the spirit, if not the letter, of the law as stated in the constitutional mandate issued by this Court in *Anders v. California,* 386 U.S. 738, is violated—where appointed appellate counsel simply files an inept Brief merely attacking the propriety of the sentence, without either filing an "*Anders*" Brief or raising any issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for murder or the fairness of the procedures resulting in conviction | 7 |
| 2. Petitioner was deprived of due process of law at his sentencing hearing, where the trial court considered psychological reports 18 to 21 years old, absent any indication of the qualifications or expertise of their preparers, and despite petitioner's arguments to the sentencing court that the reports were inaccurate and hearsay, that they were too ancient to be relevant, and that they contained privileged material | 12 |
| Conclusion | 17 |

Appendices:

A—Opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, filed December 7, 1979 ..... 1a

B—Amended Petition for Leave to Appeal, Filed in the Supreme Court of Illinois by Present Counsel for Petitioner ..... 8a

C—Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellant, Filed in the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, by the State Appellate Defender ..... 27a

D—Order of the Supreme Court of Illinois Denying Leave to Appeal, dated May 29, 1980 ..... 38a

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

*Cases*

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) ..... *passim*

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 Pa.Super. 391, 307 A. 2d 387 (Super. Ct. 1973) ..... 10

Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209, 239 A.2d 201 (1968) ..... 10

Commonwealth v. Jones, 451 Pa. 69, 301 A.2d 811 (1973) ..... 10

In re Banks, 93 Cal.Rptr. 591, 482 P.2d 215 (1971) (In Bank) ..... 10

In re Smith, 90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969 (1970) (In Bank) ..... 10

People v. Kimpel, 78 Ill.App.3d 929, 34 Ill.Dec. 254, 397 N.E.2d 926 (3 Dist. 1979) ..... 2

People v. Lang, 113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393 (1974) (In Bank) ..... 8, 9, 10, 11

People v. Wende, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071 (1979) ..... 9
Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5 Cir. 1979) ..... 13, 14
State v. McKenney, 98 Idaho 551, 568 P.2d 1213 (1977) 10
State v. Pascucci, 161 Conn. 382, 288 A.2d 407 (1971) .. 10
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) ..... 15
United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7 Cir. 1977) ..... 15
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) ..... 15
Vitek v. Jones, ..... U.S. ....., 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) ..... 13
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) ..... 13
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959) ..... 13
Wright v. State, 269 So.2d 17 (Fla. Dist. App. 1972) .... 10

*Other Authorities*

28 U.S.C. 1257(3) ..... 2
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution .... 3
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ..... 3
F.R.E. 609(b) ..... 14
Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, N.Y.U.L.Rev. § 701, 712 n.51 (1972) ..... 11
Rule 20.1 ..... 2
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution .... 3

IN THE

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

---

## No.

---

**EDWARD ANDREW KIMPEL, III,**

*Petitioner,*

VS.

**PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,**

*Respondent.*

---

## PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT

---

Petitioner, Edward Andrew Kimpel, III, respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, to review its decision affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Hancock County, Illinois, adjudging him guilty of murder and imposing a sentence of 40 years.

## OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Appellate Court is reported as *People v. Kimpel*, 78 Ill.App.3d 929, 34 Ill.Dec. 254, 397 N.E.2d 926 (3 Dist. 1979).

## JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

On December 7, 1979, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, filed its opinion affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hancock County. (App. A) No petition for rehearing was filed. On February 1, 1980, petitioner filed, *pro se*, a timely petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court of Illinois. After that Court granted extensions of time within which to file an amended petition until May 17, 1980, petitioner, through present counsel, timely filed an amended petition for leave to appeal. (App. p. 8a) This was denied (No. 52996) by the Supreme Court of Illinois on May 29, 1980. (App. p. 38a) This Petition is filed within the time allowed by an order of this Court entered on July 30, 1980, extending the time within which a petition for certiorari may be filed until August 27, 1980. (No. A-88) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257(3) and Rule 20.1.

## CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:

> "No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:

> "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part:

> "Section 1. * * * nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; * * *"

## STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, while in a highly intoxicated state, visited the deceased in her trailer home for the purpose of continuing to negotiate with her for the sale of the trailer home. During an argument which ensued, he struck and then shot the deceased. (See App. 3a; 12a)

The trial court submitted to the jury instructions on the offenses of murder and involuntary manslaughter, (see App. 15a-21a); the jury found petitioner guilty of murder.

Following a hearing in aggravation and mitigation dealing primarily with petitioner's past history of intoxication and the validity and accuracy of certain psychological reports, prepared some 18 to 21 years earlier at the Patuxent Institute, Maryland, (see pp. 1a-3a, *infra*), the court sentenced petitioner to 40 years. (Tr.S. 134)[1]

The State Appellate Defender appointed on appeal filed a brief merely raising two issues, both attacking only the sentence: (a) admission of certain evidence at the sentencing hearing, and (b) validity of the admonitions at the time of election between the old and new sentencing laws. (App. 27a-37a) Appointed appellate counsel filed no reply brief and waived oral argument. After the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the sentence—(the conviction had not been attacked)—petitioner obtained other (present) counsel who filed an amended petition for leave to appeal, raising, *inter alia*, the following substantial issues[2] as to the propriety of the conviction:

1. Limitation of proper defense argument denied defendant a fair trial. (App. 11a)
2. Defendant was deprived of a fair trial by the incomplete and misleading jury charge. (App. 14a)
3. Defendant was denied a fair trial when the court erroneously instructed the jury that they could consider the defendant's conviction of an offense as affecting his credibility, where no

[1] "Tr.S." refers to the Transcript of the Sentencing Hearing, and "C" to the Common Law Record.

[2] Appendix 8a-26a contains, verbatim, the arguments on these issues as presented to the Illinois Supreme Court. We include them to demonstrate that viable issues, though present, were not raised in the original appeal. See Point 1, *infra*, pp. 7-11.

proper evidence was offered that the conviction of the defendant was for an offense properly admitted and which may be considered on the issue of credibility. (App. 21a)

4. The trial court erroneously refused either to transfer the cause to another county or postpone the trial, although there was substantial adverse pre-trial publicity. (App. 24a)

Different counsel also demonstrated that petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal, asserting in the Amended Petition for Leave to Appeal (App. 8a):

> This court should grant leave to appeal and remand the cause back to the Appellate Court for consideration of the issues herein raised relative to the propriety of the defendant's conviction because court-appointed counsel in the Appellate Court merely filed a brief attacking the sufficiency of the sentence, thereby abandoning all issues concerning the sufficiency of the conviction without advising the court of the propriety of such abandonment.

New counsel also raised—in a more complete and advocate-like manner—prior counsel's issues involving the sentence, *i.e.*:

1. The Appellate Court erroneously held that the trial court could consider in sentencing the defendant psychological reports 18 to 21 years old, absent any indication whatsoever of the qualifications or expertise of the preparer of said reports. (Amended PLA, p. 30)
2. Defendant's election to be sentenced under the "new law" is void, where the trial court failed to advise defendant of various distinct potential sentences under both the new and the old law. (*Id.*, p. 41)

Leave to Appeal was denied. (App. 38a)

## RAISING THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS BELOW

The issue concerning ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was first raised in the Amended Petition for Leave to Appeal, App. 8a-11a.

The improprieties at the sentencing hearing were brought to the trial court's attention, as follows:

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation. (C. 160-89) The investigation included a number of documents to which petitioner objected on grounds they contained inaccurate information, were stale and hearsay, and were released, in violation of privilege, without petitioner's knowledge or consent. (C. 194-96) Among the challenged documents were some psychological evaluations from the Patuxent Institute, Maryland, dating back as far as 22 years. (Tr.S. 9)

The trial judge denied a motion to strike the contested information (Tr.S. 7, 95). The State presented no evidence supportive of the contested information, nor did the trial court make a determination as to its accuracy.

In the original appeal, appointed counsel raised the issue of the trial court's having considered improper information at sentencing, (App. 30a); while only Illinois law was cited, clearly this was a due process attack on the procedure utilized at sentencing. (App. 36a)

The additional issues raised in present counsel's Amended Petition for Leave to Appeal were raised for the first time in that Petition. While certiorari is not sought upon any of these grounds at this juncture, they are included to demonstrate the inadequacy of the appeal attacking only the sentence, as supportive of Point 1 herein.

## REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1.

**An indigent's right to counsel on appeal is not fulfilled—and the spirit, if not the letter, of the law as stated in the constitutional mandate issued by this Court in *Anders v. California,* 386 U.S. 738, is violated—where appointed appellate counsel simply files an inept Brief merely attacking the propriety of the sentence, without either filing an "*Anders*" Brief or raising any issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for murder or the fairness of the procedures resulting in conviction.**

Appointed appellate counsel "dodged" his responsibility under *Anders v. California,* 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by filing a "throw-away" Brief which did not attack the propriety of the conviction—either as to sufficiency of the evidence or as to fairness of the trial—but, rather, merely challenged the 40-year sentence for murder. (The sentencing issues raised were raised ineptly.[3] Moreover,

---

[3] The ineptness of original counsel's Brief is apparent; compare the original argument *re* the trial court's consideration of improper evidence at the sentencing hearing, App. 30a-36a, with present counsel's treatment of the issue, Point 2 of this Petition pp. 12-17, *infra.*

Ineptitude of the Brief actually filed, however, merely adds to the persuasiveness of our argument that petitioner here has *not* received what the Constitution promises in the way of appellate counsel. But even if the issues respecting the sentence *are* adequately raised, we submit this does not satisfy the *Anders* requirement if the Brief does not also attack the validity of the conviction, for there has been no *Anders* determination as to possible issues directed to the conviction.

A man in prison naturally expects his appeal to attack not only the sentence but also the conviction—especially where, as here, that conviction was obtained after a lengthy trial at which many viable issues were raised. See App. 11a-26a.

counsel failed to file a Reply Brief and waived oral argument.[4])

In *Anders*, this Court held that an indigent's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal requires that appointed counsel proceed "as an active advocate," *id.* at 744; and if, because of a good-faith belief that all possible issues are frivolous, he cannot, then his motion requesting permission to withdraw must "be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." *Ibid.*

Your Honors' decision in *Anders*[5] was designed to increase the protection afforded indigent appellants by creating a procedure requiring "the court—not counsel— . . . to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous."

---

[4] Counsel's failure to file a Reply Brief and waiver of oral argument, again, are not necessary components of our constitutional argument; however, like the quality of the Brief filed, they are factors which this Court cannot ignore in determining whether the filing of a Brief attacking merely the sentence can properly serve to obviate counsel's requirement to comply with *Anders*.

[While the record is silent whether or not petitioner personally participated in the decision to waive oral argument, we submit it cannot be presumed that he waived this substantial aspect of his right to an appeal. *Cf. People v. Lang*, 113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393 (1974) (In Bank).]

[5] While the dissenting Justices, Stewart, Black and Harlan, *id.* at 745, wrote that a court-appointed lawyer would not deem an appeal wholly frivolous if the record presented any arguable issues, they wrote in the context of a State system which permitted appointed counsel on appeal to withdraw upon writing the court a letter to that effect. In their opinion, no attorney would write such a letter if it weren't so; ergo, requiring the writing of an *Anders* brief is superfluous.

But here, there is not even the protection of such a letter, and counsel can—and in the case at bar, did—avoid having to write an *Anders* brief simply by filing a perfunctory brief concerning only the sentence.

*Ibid.*; see *People v. Wende*, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P. 2d 1071 (1979). This purpose is thwarted if appellate counsel—as at bar—merely appeals as to the propriety of the *sentence*, for it leaves to counsel—not the court—the crucial decision whether there are any "meritorious", non-frivolous issues respecting the validity of the *conviction*.

Where the lawyer on appeal merely attacks the sentence, it amounts to a return to pre-*Anders* days, when court-appointed appellate counsel could withdraw simply by filing a motion.[6] There is never, as required by *Anders*, a judicial review of the record permitting the Appellate Court to determine whether any meritorious issues could be raised as to the validity of the conviction.[7]

---

[6] Indeed, the procedure at bar is *worse* than the procedure utilized in California which this Court struck down in *Anders*; for there, court-appointed counsel, in order to withdraw from what he believed was a wholly frivolous appeal, so stated by letter to the reviewing court. This procedural safeguard—which prompted Mr. Justice Stewart to write:

> "The quixotic requirement imposed by the Court can be explained, I think, only upon the cynical assumption that an appointed lawyer's professional representation to an appellate court in a 'no-merit' letter is not to be trusted." *Id.* at 746—

is utterly lacking where a brief, though filed, merely attacks the sentence. Incidentally, the dissenters felt it relevant to note, "Certainly there was no suggestion in the present case that the petitioner's counsel was either incompetent or unethical." *Id.* at 747. While we do not impugn the ethics of petitioner's original appellate counsel at bar, we do suggest his incompetence, not only for the quality of the brief he did file, but also for failing to raise any of the substantial issues as to the conviction which could have been raised. See App. 11a-26a.

[7] For examples of State reviewing court cases interpreting *Anders*, ruling in appellant's favor in each instance, see: *People v. Lang*, 113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393 (1974) (In Bank); *In*

(Footnote continued on following page)

The *Anders* requirement that the appellate court evaluate the proceedings below is not satisfied by an appeal merely as to the sufficiency of the sentence. An indigent has a right to have counsel, "as an active advocate," attack the conviction as well, or, at the very least, to have a court of review, pursuant to *Anders*, review the record as to the sufficiency of the conviction. This does not occur when appointed counsel on appeal attacks only the sentence.[8]

Since *Anders*, lawyers confronted with their obligation have attempted to circumvent it in various ways. For example,

> "[S]ome lawyers . . . submit in support of the appeal a sketchy brief on a single, obviously meritless issue, rather than to move for permission to withdraw and thus be required to show by citation to authorities why numerous possible issues are frivolous. The former course takes much less time. However, the client is misled into believing that his

---

[7] *continued*
*re Banks*, 93 Cal.Rptr. 591, 482 P.2d 215 (1971) (In Bank); *In re Smith*, 90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969 (1970) (In Bank); *State v. Pascucci*, 161 Conn. 382, 288 A.2d 407 (1971); *Wright v. State*. 269 So.2d 17 (Fla. Dist. App. 1972); *State v. McKenney*, 98 Idaho 551, 568 P.2d 1213 (1977); *Commonwealth v. Jones*, 451 Pa. 69, 301 A.2d 811 (1973); *Commonwealth v. Baker*, 429 Pa. 209, 239 A.2d 201 (1968); *Commonwealth v. Anderson*, 224 Pa.Super. 391, 307 A.2d 387 (Super. Ct. 1973).

[8] Exhaustive research uncovered only one case resembling the instant case in terms of an appeal of the sentence only while substantial issues existed with respect to the conviction: *People v. Lang*, *supra* note 7. There, only the appellant's commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender was challenged on appeal. The reviewing court, finding possible meritorious issues going to the validity of the conviction, found denial of effective assistance of counsel. Aside from *Lang*, we found no reported cases of this kind; however, we speculate this is because the issue as framed in this Petition is rarely raised as such, rather than because few appointed attorneys file briefs attacking only the sentence.

> case was subjected to appellate scrutiny, while the lawyer is spared the possible hostility of a client who feels his counsel is giving him less than the most vigorous representation."[9]

Another method of avoiding the *Anders* obligation is for the lawyer—as here—to write a brief[10] merely as to the validity of the sentence, file no reply brief and waive oral argument.[11]

Had appointed counsel been required to file an *Anders*-type brief as to the validity of the conviction, he would have been forced to focus on issues which, upon proper review, would have demonstrated that petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. And therein lies the prejudice. Allowing counsel to get away with filing a brief directed only to the sentencing procedures can only encourage *Anders* violations, thus eroding that very right to counsel *Anders* was designed to preserve.

Certiorari should be granted so that this Court may address itself to this perplexing aspect of the problem of how to deal with enforcing every indigent defendant's right to appeal. Where the brief which is filed goes only to the sentence, we submit that requiring an *Anders*-type brief respecting the conviction may be the only effective available means.

And, upon consideration of the merits of the issues, the cause should be remanded to the State reviewing court with appropriate directions.[12]

---

[9] Hermann, *Frivolous Criminal Appeals*, N.Y.U.L.REV. § 701, 712 n.51 (1972).

[10] And an inept one, at that.

[11] *Cf. People v. Lang*, *supra* note 4, and discussion in note 8, *supra*.

[12] If this Court agrees with us on the merits of this issue, an appropriate order might be to remand with directions that the State reviewing court permit a fresh appeal.

2.

**Petitioner was deprived of due process of law at his sentencing hearing, where the trial court considered psychological reports 18 to 21 years old, absent any indication of the qualifications or expertise of their preparers, and despite petitioner's arguments to the sentencing court that the reports were inaccurate and hearsay, that they were too ancient to be relevant, and that they contained privileged material.**

Petitioner moved to strike six documents contained within the pre-sentence report, including several psychological evaluations from the Patuxent Institute in Maryland,[13] asserting that the statements therein were prepared by persons lacking the requisite qualifications to render an expert opinion and were inaccurate. Additionally, petitioner argued that these documents were inadmissible for any or all of the following reasons: (i) they were hearsay; (ii) they were too old to be relevant; and (iii) they contained material given under privilege and therefore not properly admissible. (Tr.S. 5-8)

By denying the motion to strike the Patuxent evidence while, by way of contrast, excluding from his consideration other evidence objected to by petitioner (general hearsay reports from authorities in Iowa) (Tr.S. 3-4), the trial judge demonstrated his belief in the trust-

---

[13] The reports in part state:

"He [defendant] has the capacity for sadistic action. These appear to be both conscious and unconscious and the protocol presents evidence of extreme aggressitivity. [*sic.*] It seems that maintaining distance from others is not a satisfactory method of defending against his sadistic impulses . . . The possibility appears that he will tend to get into progressively greater difficulty with society for crimes which will become progressively more aggressive and dangerous." (C. 181)

worthiness of the Patuxent reports. (Tr.S. 7) In other words, he obviously relied on them in making the sentencing determination; thus the court's refusal to exclude them cannot be deemed "harmless error".

After mentioning the holdings cited by petitioner dictating the exclusion of such evidence, and without any rationale, the Appellate Court concluded: "We are not persuaded that the reports were improperly received." (App. 5a)[14]

Although a trial court's reliance on hearsay in assessing punishment is not improper *per se*, *Williams v. Oklahoma*, 358 U.S. 576 (1959); *Williams v. New York*; 337 U.S. 241 (1949), due process will not permit the presentation of highly prejudicial evidence at sentencing without defendant's being given an adequate opportunity to challenge its reliability. *Cf. Vitek v. Jones*, ..... U.S. ....., 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). There, this Court held that in a hearing to contest transfer of a prisoner from a penal institution to a mental institution, there is a due process right to "confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state, except upon a finding . . . of good cause for not permitting such . . . confrontation, or cross-examination." 63 L.Ed.2d at 566.

So too, as to sentencing, where alleged expert evidence is offered, the sole procedure that can insure that the court will not rely on unreliable information, when reports are submitted by alleged experts, is for the experts to be required to appear and have their opinions tested by cross-examination. *Smith v. Estelle*, 602 F.2d 694 (5 Cir. 1979).

---

[14] Since no reason was set forth by the Appellate Court, petitioner cannot discuss the court's rationale, and will therefore proceed to demonstrate why such holding is erroneous.

Here, that right was denied by the admission of 18 to 21 year old reports, asserting an expert opinion on petitioner's mental condition and diagnosing him as a person with "sadistic impulses". Admission of this statement violated petitioner's constitutional right of confrontation and due process.

Additionally, the reports contain material, the use of which at the sentencing hearing violated petitioner's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Much of the objected-to material in the reports was based on statements made by petitioner while obtaining medical treatment. These reports clearly qualify as privileged information, the disclosure of which was inappropriate. Moreover, petitioner could not have been forced by the court to disclose this information to a psychiatrist or psychologist for the purpose and use of such information in a sentencing hearing. See *Smith v. Estelle, supra.* Presenting such evidence at a sentencing hearing, after it was obtained from an interview of a defendant for other purposes, violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. *Ibid.*

Moreover, these reports are too old to have evidentiary value; therefore their admission is error. As prior convictions, after a span of years, lose evidentiary worth as to "credibility",[15] so too, psychological evaluations, absent recent reaffirmation by re-testing, must lose validity after a period of years. Here, the 18 to 21 year old reports are so old that they have no evidentiary worth, and their consideration by the trial court denied petitioner due process.

Because the reliability of the conclusions of the persons who prepared the reports cannot be tested, because

[15] See, *e.g.*, F.R.E. 609(b).

the report is based on information that cannot properly be used against petitioner without violating his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, and because of the staleness of the reports, the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to strike was error.

* * *

The Appellate Court erroneously held that any error in admitting such prejudicial material would not require reversal of the sentence because there is no evidence that petitioner was prejudiced thereby. (App. 5a)

The trial court specifically excluded certain evidence objected to by the petitioner and refused to exclude other evidence. (Tr.S. 3-4) He thereby conclusively demonstrated that he believed such evidence was relevant and proper for his consideration. See *United States v. Harris*, 558 F.2d 366 (7 Cir. 1977), where the court held:

> "The vindication of a defendant's right to not be sentenced on the basis of improper factors or erroneous information—a right recognized by the court in Townsend and Tucker[16]—should not depend upon the fortuity of the sentencing judge disclosing, perhaps inadvertently, the factors relied upon in the imposition of sentence. *The fairness of the sentencing process is undermined by reliance upon inaccurate information, not by the sentencing judge stating that he relied upon the material which proves to be inaccurate.*" 558 F.2d at 366.

Nor is there any validity in the court's attempt to assert that the sentence here of 40 years, which requires

---

16 *I.e., United States v. Tucker*, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), and *Townsend v. Burke*, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).

at least 20 years of incarceration—even if the petitioner is the most model inmate—would be justified even absent the improper prejudicial material in the reports because of petitioner's extensive record of delinquency and criminal convictions. A review in detail of the petitioner's history[17] demonstrates that although it may be long, it is all for petty offenses, not one of which is a crime of violence or a crime against a person; and it is extremely doubtful whether such records would meet present-day due process standards.

---

[17] Petitioner's prior conviction record, as found in the presentence report, is as follows:

> "*1946*, Baltimore, Maryland, at the age of fifteen this defendant was declared delinquent mainly for repeatedly running away from home. This defendant was given one year probation which he violated and, as a result, he was committed to the Maryland Training School for Boys for one year. *1952*, Baltimore, Md., bogus checks, sent to the Maryland House of Corrections for one year; *1955*, paroled from the Maryland House of Corrections; *1955*, New Orleans, La., worthless checks, returned to Baltimore, Md. for parole violation; *1956*, Jessup, Md., three charges for larceny, three years at House of Corrections; *1956*, transferred to Patuxent Institution at Jessup, Md. for evaluation as a defective delinquent; *1956*, Patuxent Institution, forgery and false pretenses, three years suspended sentence; *1957*, committed by Baltimore City Court as a defective delinquent and sentenced to an indeterminate term; *1960*, recommitted as a defective delinquent at a rehearing in Baltimore City criminal court; *1962*, defendant was granted a school release by the Board of Review to attend the University of Maryland, failed to return and was officially declared a violator; *1962*, Brownsville, Texas, speeding, fined $7.00 (under the name of Edward Andrew Kimpel, alias date of birth 7-10-31 and alias place of birth, Deland, Fla.); *1974*, Pikesville, Md., escape, returned to Patuxent Institution; *1975*, granted unconditional release from custody of Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent; *1976*, Peoria, Il., theft, ten days jail; *1976*, Burlington, Ia., false pretenses, seven years suspended sentence plus an outstanding warrant for parole violation issued on May 4, 1977."

The 40 year sentence, permitting parole only after 20 years incarceration, was caused by the prejudicial allegations in the psychological reports.

The admission of prejudicial "expert opinion", absent ability to confront the expert, denied due process. Certiorari should be allowed to permit this Court to speak to the due process requirements at sentencing hearings.

## CONCLUSION

For either or both of the foregoing reasons, certiorari should be allowed.

Respectfully submitted,

FREDERICK F. COHN
CAROLINE JAFFE
35 East Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 641-0692
*Attorneys for Petitioner*

# APPENDIX A

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT

No. 78-349

December 7, 1979

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

*Plaintiff-Appellee.*

*v.*

EDWARD ANDREW KIMPEL, III,

*Defendant-Appellant.*

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Hancock County.
Honorable U.S. COLLINS, *Judge Presiding.*

MR. JUSTICE STENGEL delivered the opinion of the Court:

Following a jury trial defendant Edward Andrew Kimpel III was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment. The only issues upon appeal pertain to the sentencing hearing.

At the time of sentencing, defendant moved to strike several psychological evaluations which were attached to the presentence report. At the time of his conviction,

defendant was 46 years of age and had been convicted of nine prior offenses beginning in 1946 at age 15. Three of the psychological evaluations in question were prepared by counsellors at Patuxent Institute in Maryland where defendant was incarcerated from 1956 until 1962. These evaluations were dated 1957, 1959, and 1960, and each included a discussion of defendant's psychological problems based upon tests and an interview. Each one concluded that he was capable of violent behavior and that his conduct could be expected to become progressively worse. The trial court denied the motion to strike these reports, as well as some later reports not involved in this appeal, and then permitted defendant to introduce evidence to refute the accuracy of these reports.

Defendant testified at length concerning these evaluations. He denied that he had provided any information which would support the conclusions of the interviewers, and he challenged particular findings as erroneous. For example, he disputed a 1957 finding that his IQ was 114. He reminded the court that his IQ was reported to be over 140 at a pre-trial competency hearing, and then he stated, "I function at a higher level than 114." He also disputed statements that he lacked effective relationships at home, that he suffered from an oedipal complex, and that he was manipulative. He also pointed out the inconsistency between the conclusion that he was potentially violent and the authorization in 1960 allowing him to attend classes at the University of Maryland during the day and to return to Patuxent Institute in the evening. (We note that in 1962 he failed to return and remained at large for 12 years.)

Following defendant's testimony, the motion to strike was renewed and again denied. The State presented no

evidence in aggravation. The trial court then heard evidence in mitigation at which point defendant again testified, explaining in some detail the circumstances surrounding his shooting of Patricia Hull. He stated he is an epileptic and an alcoholic, that he becomes paranoid when he is drunk, that he has been hospitalized nine times for acute alcholism, and that he was in an "alcoholic blackout" at the time of the murder.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing the trial court explained that defendant had the right to elect to be sentenced under the sentencing provisions in effect after February 1, 1978, or those in effect prior to that date. The court further explained the provisions of the two statutes and then allowed defendant time to confer with his counsel. After being assured by both defendant and his attorney that defendant fully understood the penalty under each law, the court inquired as to defendant's choice. Defendant elected to be sentenced under the new law, and the court then imposed a maximum sentence of 40 years. In announcing sentence the judge discussed the circumstances of the offense and the seriousness of the injury inflicted, defendant's prior history of delinquency and criminality, and the fact that a greater than minimum sentence would be necessary to deter others from committing the same crime.

On appeal defendant first contends that the trial court erred when it refused to strike the three psychological evaluations dated 1957, 1959, and 1960. In support of his contention defendant cites *People v. Vaughn* (5th Dist. 1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 700, 371 N.E.2d 1248, where a seven-year-old Tennessee prison report classifying the defendant as a "Sociopath" was held to have been improperly considered at the sentencing hearing. Defendant also relies upon *People v. Crews* (1967), 38 Ill.2d

331, 231 N.E.2d 451, where the trial judge had stated, before announcing a sentence of death, that he had read a juvenile caseworker's report recounting statements attributed to the defendant's 4½-year-old son which described previous mistreatment of the 2-year-old murder victim. The supreme court observed that clearly the trial judge was influenced by the report, and then stated:

> "Plainly, a judge with the solemn responsibility of determining the punishment of the convicted is to be encouraged to hear and consider all available and pertinent information concerning the person and the crime, so as to enable him to impose a punishment which is appropriate. However, before relying on such information the judge must determine its accuracy. [citation], and he must take care to shield his mind from what might be the prejudicial effect of unreliable and other improper evidence. [Citation.] If it is shown that the convicted has been prejudiced by the procedure adopted, or material considered by the trial court in conducting its inquiry prior to the imposition of punishment, the resultant penalty will not be allowed to stand." (38 Ill. 2d at 337-8.)

Defendant argues that here the trial court should have stricken the reports because the only evidence received by the court on the issue of their reliability was defendant's testimony that the reports were inaccurate and that the conclusions were false.

The Unified Code of Corrections provides that, where a defendant is convicted of a felony, a written presentence report of investigation must be presented to and considered by the court unless waived by defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-3-1.) This report is to be considered at the sentencing hearing (par. 1005-4-1 (a)(2) ) and must included information concerning defen-

dant's physical and mental history and condition, history of delinquency or criminality, and other matters deemed relevant (par. 1005-3-2(a)). In some cases the sentencing procedure has been challenged on the ground that the State has introduced unsubstantiated evidence indicating other criminal conduct, and in those cases, it has been held that the accuracy and reliability of such evidence must be established and that defendant is entitled to cross-examine persons with first hand knowledge of the supposed criminal activity. (See, *e.g.*, *People v. Kirk* (3rd Dist. 1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 49, 378 N.E.2d 795.) However, we note that here the disputed reports do not involve evidence of prior crimes.

In the instant case we are not persuaded that the reports were improperly received, but even if the trial court did err in admitting these reports into evidence, such error would not be reversible because there is no reason for concluding that defendant was prejudiced by the disputed material. As was said in *People v. Wilson* (1st Dist. 1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 693, 696, 297 N.E.2d 277, 279:

> "[T]he mere fact that a trial judge, before imposing sentence, is aware of certain inadmissible facts does not automatically insure a reversal of that sentence. The function of a reviewing court is not to determine whether the record is perfect, but to determine whether defendant had a fair trial. Where it can be said from the record that an error complained of could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed."

In fact, it has been said that there must be a "definitive indication" that the court considered the improper evidence. (*People v. Gaines* (1st Dist. 1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 839, 316 N.E.2d 14.) In the case at bar there is no in-

dication that the trial court took into account the psychological evaluations in determining the sentence since the court did not mention them in announcing sentence.

Certainly, there was ample competent evidence in the record to support the 40-year sentence which was imposed. Defendant shot the 20-year-old victim twice in the back of the head, just above the neck. Defendant, who was 46 years of age, had an extensive record of delinquency and criminal convictions dating back to 1946. These were among the factors mentioned by the trial judge in announcing sentence, and we believe the sentence was appropriate under the circumstances.

Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred when explaining the choice between being sentenced under the prior law or the law in effect after February 1, 1978, by failing to inform the defendant of the possibility of parole under the sentencing law in effect prior to February 1, 1978.

The trial judge fully explained the provisions of each sentencing scheme except the matter of parole availability under the old law, and the record establishes that prior to making an election, defendant was granted a five-minute recess to discuss the election with his counsel. We have previously held that when the record establishes that defendant has discussed the alternatives with his counsel, in the absence of a contention of inadequate counsel or an indication that defendant misunderstood the consequences of his decision, the failure of the trial court to explain the range of available sentences is not error. (*People v. Hackett* (3d Dist., Docket No. 78-271, Oct. 23, 1979), ..... Ill. App. 3d ....., ..... N.E.2d ..... .) The rationale underlying this rule is that the primary responsibility of advising the defen-

dant as to the differences between the sentencing law lies with the defense counsel. (See *People v. Peoples* (3d Dist. 1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 842, 390 N.E.2d 554.) Similarly, under the circumstances present here, the failure to explain parole availability was not error.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hancock County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

STOUDER, P.J., and ALLOY, J., concur.

# APPENDIX B

## AMENDED PETITION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

[Filed In The Supreme Court Of Illinois
By Present Counsel For Petitioner.]

1.

**Introduction**

**THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL AND REMAND THE CAUSE BACK TO THE APPELLATE COURT FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUES HEREIN RAISED RELATIVE TO THE PROPRIETY OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION BECAUSE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN THE APPELLATE COURT MERELY FILED A BRIEF ATTACKING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE SENTENCE, THEREBY ABANDONING ALL ISSUES CONCERNING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE CONVICTION WITHOUT ADVISING THE COURT OF THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH ABANDONMENT.**

Counsel appointed an attorney for an appeal has the right to have that attorney be an advocate. *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493. Counsel cannot therefore abandon his client and surrender his client's right to have the propriety of his conviction litigated on appeal merely by moving to withdraw or otherwise taking no action. To insure that this does not occur, the court in *Anders* held:

> "If counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." 386 U.S. 738 at 744.

An indigent's *right* to an appellate brief attacking the sufficiency of his conviction (unless appointed counsel has complied with the rule of *Anders*) cannot be diluted by counsel's merely attacking the sufficiency of appellant's sentence and raising no issue(s) as to the sufficiency of the conviction without filing an *Anders* brief as to the potential errors with regard to the conviction. To permit this to occur negates the entire purpose of the *Anders* rule, in that it prevents a court of review from making a determination that there were no errors in obtaining the conviction. *Cf. People v. Wende*, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071.

Here, court-appointed counsel merely raised errors as to the propriety of the sentence. Neither affirmatively as an advocate, nor in the form of an *Anders* brief, did he raise the numerous issues set forth below which are not frivolous issues; some of them rise to the level of plain error.

This court should, then, grant leave to appeal and, under its supervisory power pursuant to the philosophy of *Anders v. California*, resubmit this cause to the Appellate Court, Third District so that defendant can have an adjudication of those issues by the Appellate Court.

As an alternative, this court, upon granting leave to appeal, should consider those issues itself. The court has the power so to do.

Although the general rule is that errors not raised in the Appellate Court will not be considered by the Supreme Court—"This is not a hard and fast rule, and where [the] Court can see that the application of it would result in great injustice, it will not be blindly adhered to." *People v. Donahoe*, 279 Ill. 411, 117 N.E.

105. The rule that errors not raised in the Appellate Court are waived, as the rule that new matters cannot be raised on Petition for Rehearing, states an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the court. *Hux v. Raben*, 38 Ill.2d 223, 230 N.E.2d 831.

In *Hux*, the court equated the rule governing waiver due to failure to raise a matter in the Appellate Court, to the plain error rule which permits errors not raised in the trial court to be considered on appeal due to the extreme nature of the prejudice. See also *People v. Baltimore*, 7 Ill.App.3d 633, 288 N.E.2d 659; *People v. Murrell*, 60 Ill.2d 287, 326 N.E.2d 762.

Hence, applicable to this court's authority to consider issues here raised for the first time is the court's statement in *People v. Hamby*, 32 Ill.2d 291, 205 N.E.2d 456, 458 (1965):

> "We consider the waiver principle a salutary one, conducive to the effective enforcement of the rules which society has established for its protection, but we have not hesitated to relax its application where fundamental fairness so requires."

Similarly, it has been held "the waiver rule will not be applied to bar review of those issues as to which review by direct appeal has been unconstitutionally denied because of deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal." *People v. Blewett*, 11 Ill.App.3d 1051, 298 N.E.2d 366, 369 (1973), relying on *People v. Frank*, 48 Ill.2d 500, 272 N.E.2d 25 (1971).

Here, no issues were raised on appeal as to the propriety of the conviction and no "*Anders*" brief was filed. Appointed appellate counsel did not choose to file a

reply brief or argue the issues he did raise,[1] and instead moved to waive oral argument. See Appendix B. In truth, he waived defendant's right to appeal by the sham of a brief, thereby avoiding complying with *Anders v. California*. Defendant was deprived of effective appellate counsel.

For the above reasons, the court should either grant leave to appeal and transfer the cause to the Appellate Court to consider issues not there presented, or grant leave to appeal and consider those issues.

2.

**LIMITATION OF PROPER DEFENSE ARGUMENT DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.**

Although the trial court has great discretion in regulating final argument, preventing defense counsel from making a proper and necessary argument can so negate defendant's rights, both to counsel and to present his theory of the case, as to deny him a fair trial. *Herring v. New York*, 422 U.S. 593, 45 L.Ed.2d 593; *People v. McMullen*, 300 Ill. 383, 133 N.E. 328; *State v. Dickerson*, ..... S.W.2d ....., 27 CRL 2053, Mo. Ct. Appeals. That is what occurred here, when the court prohibited counsel from arguing that defendant had no motive to kill the deceased.

Defense counsel, in arguing that the homicide was due to recklessness on the part of the defendant, attempted to make a proper argument that defendant had no

[1] There was validity to the issues he did raise. See Points 6 and 7 of this Petition. However, he failed to properly present or argue those issues. (See his brief, Appendix C, and compare to Points 6 and 7.) [Note: References to Appendices are to those filed with the Amended PLA, not to those filed with this Petition for Certiorari.]

motivation or reason to kill the deceased. He was prevented from so doing. The following occurred:

"He came in and gave an affirmative defense to you, that he did not intend to kill Patricia Hull, that it was not murder.

True, he believed that he was the cause of her death and there is no doubt about that, but how that occurred, that is for you to decide. Did he intend to kill that woman? That is the issue before you.

Now, we all know that human beings act—some motives in life. I mean, if you go out and find the window of your car has been smashed open, it was probably done by somebody that didn't like you. If you go home and find that somebody plowed up your yard, it was probably somebody that didn't like you and they did it for a reason. Where is any evidence of such a motivation by Mr. Kimpel to kill Patricia Hull?

There is no relationship between him and Mrs. Hull. They don't even know each other except when they met when the trailer was to be sold. None whatsoever. There is no motivation here.

Mr. Corcoran:

Objection. Motivation is not an element necessary for this offense.

Mr. Naylor:

I didn't say it was.

The Court:

Sustained. Proceed.

Mr. Naylor:

Before you can find evidence that Mr. Kimpel intended to kill the girl, you've got to locate and identify the real human life impulses that are behind such motivation, behind such an intention, to formulate the intention.

I'm sorry if I used the word motivation, but that's what it is to me. Why did somebody act? Before you find that somebody acted intentionally, you should be able to find a reason for it.

Mr. Corcoran:

I object to this version. It is restating the same thing.

The Court:

Sustained. Confine your arguments to the evidence and the inferences drawn." (Tr. 1070-1072)

Sustaining the State objection was prejudicial error.

Although the prosecution can obtain a conviction without proof of motive and can under certain circumstances have the jury so instructed (see IPI Criminal 3.04)[2], a defendant clearly has the right to argue that he did not commit an offense in that his acts were reckless and not intentional because he had no reason or motive to commit the offense. Preventing this argument was analogous to the situation requiring reversal in *State v. Dickerson*, ..... S.W.2d ....., 27 CRL 2053, Mo. Ct. Appeals. There, the court held that a defense lawyer should have been allowed to argue that the defendant, being so close to the termination of his parole, would not have risked committing an offense and therefore jeopardizing satisfactory termination of his parole. The court found counsel's argument "sensible and credible". The court held that even though the prosecution need not prove motive as an element of the offense, preventing an argument that defendant had no "motive" was error. The court stated:

---

[2] "Motive is that which prompts a person to act. The State is not required to prove motive for the commission of the crime charged." IPI 3.04.

It is reversible error to give such instruction where the prosecution has presented evidence of motive. *People v. Manzella*, 56 Ill.2d 187, 306 N.E.2d 16; *People v. Enright*, 256 Ill. 221, 99 N.E.2d 936. Here, it would have been error to give such an instruction because the prosecution, through witness Meyer, offered evidence of alleged motive, *i.e.*, defendant was having an affair with the victim and she was ruining defendant's marriage. (Tr. 868)

> "A twin aspect of this argument was defense counsel's attempt to argue that defendant had no motive to commit the burglary in question. The state argues that motive is not an element of burglary and, therefore, argues that motive was neither relevant or material in the instant case. We disagree. Admittedly, motive is not an element of the crime charged and, thus, there was no need to formally instruct the jury on motive. E.g., State v. Parker, 509 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Mo. 1974). Nonetheless, defendant did take the stand and deny the acts in question. Thus, the question of motive became important and the absence of motive, arguably, shows innocence. State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo. banc 1975). In such a case, lack of motive is a proper matter for argument before the jury. See State v. Aitken, 144 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Mo. 1912). Thus, the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from arguing the relevant meaning of defendant's parole status. See State v. Treadway; State v. Ball. 27 CRL 2053, 2054.

The same rationale of *Dickerson* is applicable here. Even though the State need not prove motive, a defendant has a right to argue that he did not intentionally kill deceased as the State *charges*, because he had no motive to do so.

The trial court confused "a difference between an instruction . . . and argument of counsel." *United States v. Mahone*, 537 F.2d 922 at 927.

Here, defendant's argument that the shooting was reckless and due to his intoxicated state because he had no motive to kill deceased, was "sensible and credible" argument. Preventing this argument on the basis that the prosecution need not prove motive was erroneous and deprived defendant of a fair trial.

3.

**DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BY THE INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING JURY CHARGE.**

The instructions, as they attempted to define murder and involuntary manslaughter, and advised the jury of the relationship between those two offenses, were erroneous because: (a) no instruction was given defining the offense of murder; (b) the "issues" instruction defining the offense of murder failed to advise the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of murder, the State would have to prove that defendant's acts were not done recklessly; (c) although the jury was advised of the definition of "recklessness", a necessary element, the jury was not advised of the definition of "intentionally", also an essential element.

Additionally, the court failed to advise the jury that defendant specifically was charged with involuntary manslaughter, merely advising the jury that defendant was charged with murder.

Based on testimony offered by defendant, the trial court found it appropriate to submit to the jury instructions both on the defense of voluntary intoxication and on involuntary manslaughter. However, although the court properly submitted to the jury an instruction defining recklessness,[3] the court neglected to define for the jury the alternative mental state, *i.e.*, "intentionally". As the instruction defining recklessness was drawn from

[3] The instruction reads, "A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that certain circumstances exist or that a result will follow and such disregard constitutes a gross departure from the care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." (Tr. 1098)

Chap. 38, Sec. 4-6, a similar instruction should have been given defining intent, as defined by Sec. 4-4 of Chap. 38. Such an instruction was required because, where the jury had to determine whether defendant acted intentionally or recklessly or whether voluntary intoxication prevented the defendant from being able to act intentionally, (Tr. 1098), the term "intentionally" could *not* be left to the jurors' individual opinions because it was being used as a "term of art," a legal term.

At first blush a court might believe that the term "intentional" needs no definition because it is commonly understood by lay persons. The legislative history, however, demonstrates how wrong this first impression is. In defining "intent" in Sec. 4-4 of Chap. 38, the drafters specifically limited the term "intent", rendering it narrower than the commonly used connotation of that term. The Committee Comments, Smith-Hurd, Annotated Statutes, Chap. 38, Sec. 1-1 to 8 at p. 256 reads:

> "The use of the word 'intent' in the 1961 Code is limited to conscious objectives or purposes to accomplish a described result, as distinguished from the 'general intent' which often has been used to describe a presumption of culpability which follows from injury or awareness that certain voluntary acts will, or probably will, have wrongful or unlawful results."

Hence, since the legislative definition of intent is *narrower* in scope than that which a "lay person" might consider applicable, it is absolutely necessary for a jury to be properly instructed on the statutory definition.

In an analogous situation, in *United States v. Krosky*, 418 F.2d 65, the court reversed, holding it was plain error for the trial court not to give an instruction defining "wilfulness", where wilfulness was an essential in-

gredient of the crime charged. Terms like "wilful", and "intentional", although commonly used by lay persons, have particular "legal meanings" that must be conveyed to the jury by proper instructions. Here, failing to define the term intentionally, and thereby permitting the jurors to convict under their own standards of what is an "intentional" act possibly different from the standard defined by statute, deprived defendant of a fair trial.

* * *

The instructions also were erroneous because the "issues" instruction failed to advise the jury that to convict defendant of murder it was necessary for them to find that his actions were not reckless.

The court instructed the jury on the issues of murder as follows:

> "To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
>
> First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Patricia Hull;
>
> Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill Patricia Hull; and,
>
> Third: That the defendant was then capable of acting intentionally.
>
> If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.
>
> If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty." (Tr. 1099-1100)

This instruction is defective because it fails to advise the jury that they cannot convict the defendant of

murder unless they find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was *not* acting recklessly. The failure to so advise the jury in the issues instruction is comparable to the situation wherein the court reversed for the failure of the issues instructions to advise the jury that to find the defendant guilty, they must find that he was not acting either in self-defense or with an unreasonable belief that he was acting in self-defense. See *People v. Ortez*, 65 Ill.App.3d 525, 382 N.E.2d 303, 21 Ill.Dec. 939; *People v. Singleton*, 41 Ill.App.3d 665, 354 N.E.2d 464, *People v. Sunquist*, 55 Ill.App.3d 263, 370 N.E.2d 864, 12 Ill.Dec. 953 and IPI Criminal Instruction 27.01. In *People v. Ortez*, 65 Ill.App.3d 525, 382 N.E.2d 303, 21 Ill.Dec. 939, the court reversed because:

> "While the jury was given the instruction on the lawful use of force in defense of person (IPI Criminal, No. 24.06) they were never informed that they were to consider that instruction with respect to the crime of involuntary manslaughter . . . Thus, the jury could reasonably have interpreted Instruction No. 24.06 as relating solely to the offense of murder."

The situation here is analogous. Although instructed as to the definition of recklessness and its application within the offense of involuntary manslaughter, the jury was never advised that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's acts were not reckless in regard to the definition of the offense of murder. As in *Ortez*, the jury could have believed that the concept of recklessness "related solely to the offense of" manslaughter.

Although the defense of self-defense is an affirmative defense, the defenses here raised—(1) intoxication and (2) that the shooting was reckless—are so similar in nature that the rule requiring an issues instruction to

advise that the State must prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense, also requires the jury be advised that the State must prove that defendant's act was not reckless. Under authority of *People v. Singleton, supra, People v. Ortez, supra,* and *People v. Sunquist, supra,* and also *People v. Wright,* 32 Ill.App.3d 736, 336 N.E.2d 18, *People v. Graves,* 61 Ill.App.3d 732, 378 N.E.2d 293, 18 Ill.Dec. 829, the issues instruction was erroneous.

> *The court erroneously failed to advise the jury that defendant was charged with a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.*

IPI Criminal 2.01 requires the court, in instructing the jury as to the offenses for which the defendant is charged, to "insert all lesser included crimes as to which the jury will receive a form of the verdict." Here, therefore, it was necessary to advise the jury that the crime of involuntary manslaughter is included within the offense of murder. See IPI 2.01 and 27.01 (sample set of instructions). Instead of so advising the jury, the court erroneously merely advised:

> "The defendant is charged with the crime of murder." (Tr. 1097)

This error was prejudicial because here, the prosecutor's argument attempted to persuade the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder and not manslaughter because defendant was only charged with murder. He argued:

> "You will be offered an instruction by reason of the law of the State of Illinois on the issue of involuntary manslaughter. He is charged with murder. It is a horrible thing to think about. He is charged with it because he did it. The evidence shows that. He did not commit involuntary manslaughter." (Tr. 1062)

And again the prosecutor relied upon the offense with which the defendant was charged:

> "We are charging him with murder, not involuntary manslaughter." (Tr. 1091-1092)

These arguments asserted to the jury that in determining what verdict they reach, they should consider the offense with which defendant was originally charged. Such argument of the prosecutor would be meaningless, but for the court's erroneous instruction which also told the jury that the defendant is charged with murder, and thereby, by implication, advised them that he was not also charged with involuntary manslaughter. Jurors are ever mindful of the statement or preferences of the court, *People v. Sprinkle*, 27 Ill.2d 398, 189 N.E.2d 295, particularly when those statements are contained within the instruction given. *Bollenbach v. United States*, 326 U.S. 607, 90 L.Ed. 354. In *United States v. Wolfson*, 573 F.2d 216 (5 Cir. 1978), speaking on jury instructions, the court stated, p. 221:

> "In any event, we look to the words of the trial court, not defense counsel, in determining if jury instructions are adequate. The burden of giving proper instructions is on the Judge. F.R.Crim.P. 30. And it is his words, not the lawyer's, which 'carry an authority bordering on the irrefutable.' Moody v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 377 F.2d 175, 179."

In *United States v. Dellinger*, 472 F.2d [340] at 386, the court stated:

> "The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling."

Here, the jury, in making its choice, had before it the argument of the prosecutor that defendant is only charged with murder, corroborated by the trial court's

"irrefutable" instruction that defendant was only charged with murder.

In rejecting the manslaughter opinion and reaching a verdict of guilty of murder, the jury could have taken into consideration that the court advised them that defendant was charged with murder—without advising them he was also charged with involuntary manslaughter. Due to the erroneous instruction, plain error occurred.

The combined effect of the errors which occurred in instructing the jury negated the possibility of a fair determination, requiring reversal as plain error. *People v. Wright*, 24 Ill.App.3d 523, 321 N.E.2d 52. See *People v. Davis*, 74 Ill.App.2d 450, 321 N.E.2d 63; *Screws v. United States*, 325 U.S. 91, 89 L.Ed. 1495.

4.

**DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF AN OFFENSE AS AFFECTING HIS CREDIBILITY, WHERE NO PROPER EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS FOR AN OFFENSE PROPERLY ADMITTED AND WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED ON THE ISSUE OF CREDIBILITY.**

The court instructed the jury:

> "Evidence of defendant's previous conviction of a crime is to be considered by you only insofar as it may affect his credibility as a witness, and must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of the crime with which he is charged." (R. 145, Tr. 1098)[4]

This instruction was erroneous because, although there was evidence that defendant had been convicted of an

[4] The record does not show who tendered this instruction.

offense, there was no evidence before the jury that defendant had been convicted of an offense that could properly be used to affect credibility. Under the decision of *People v. Montgomery*, 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, convictions which affect credibility are infamous crimes and/or or felonies or misdemeanors that demonstrate untrustworthiness. Conviction of other offenses, although possibly admissible for some other purpose, cannot be considered by the jury as affecting defendant's credibility. *Cf. People v. Brown*, 61 Ill.App.3d 180, 377 N.E.2d 1201, 18 Ill.Dec. 565.

"The party seeking to impeach testimony has the responsibility of presenting evidence of an impeaching conviction." *People v. Yost*, ..... Ill.2d ....., 399 N.E.2d 1283 at 1285, 35 Ill.Dec. 755. The sole proper method of admitting such testimony is by an authenticated copy of the conviction. *People v. Kallas*, ..... Ill.App.3d ....., 389 N.E.2d 1382, 28 Ill.Dec. 9. Here, this was not done. Hence, there was no evidence of an offense before the jury that could be considered for impeachment. Instructing the jury that defendant's credibility could be affected by his conviction of a crime, when no evidence existed as to such conviction, improperly disparaged defendant's credibility and denied him a fair trial.

In *People v. Richards*, ..... Ill.App.3d ....., 381 N.E.2d 307, 21 Ill.Dec. 229, the court reversed for similar error. There, defendant was charged with indecent liberties with a child. Admitted was prior contact between defendant and others, not as evidence of prior similar crimes, but evidence showing prior "relationship and familiarity of the parties." 381 N.E.2d at 308. The court, however, gave to the jury IPI Criminal No. 3.14, referring to evidence of other "crimes". The Appellate Court, in reversing, stated:

"Moreover, the use of the term 'crimes' in the instruction was most certainly error since the defendant had not been charged or convicted of any crime.

The function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence submitted, so that the jury may, by the application of proper legal principles, arrive at a correct conclusion according to the law and the evidence. (People v. Gambony (1948), 402 Ill. 74, 83 N.E.2d 321, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 910, 69 S.Ct. 1045, 93 L.Ed. 1722.) Furthermore, it is reversible error to inject into the case, by way of instruction, issues which are not properly before the jury. People v. McCauley (1972), 2 Ill.App.3d 734, 277 N.E.2d 541." 381 N.E.2d 307 at 308.

Here, there was no evidence before the jury that defendant had been convicted of an offense that could affect his credibility. Instructing the jury that there was, is error.

Vital to the defense was defendant's credibility. Instructing the jury that they could consider defendant's conviction as affecting his credibility, when no evidence was presented, resulted in a situation analogous to *People v. Yost, supra.* Here, the jury considered defendant's credibility affected by convictions that could not properly affect his credibility. It makes no difference if the jury considers "stale convictions", as in *Yost*, or convictions not otherwise proper for consideration of credibility.

Here, where the error was due to an improper instruction—and jurors are so affected by the words of the court—the error was most prejudicial, *People v. Richards, supra*; *Bollenbach v. United States*, 326 U.S. 607, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1940), requiring a reversal.

5.

**THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED EITHER TO TRANSFER THE CAUSE TO ANOTHER COUNTY OR POSTPONE THE TRIAL ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL ADVERSE PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.**

Prior to trial, there was extensive publicity including editorials in the local newspaper complimenting the prosecutor and the sheriff for doing a job well done. (Tr.H. 21-22, March 8, 1978)[5] The extent of the prejudice was evident also from the *voir dire.* A total of 50 jurors were *voir dired.* Of those 9 were excused for cause, the reasons having nothing to do with prejudice, *i.e.*, 2 to care for father, 2 to care for crops, 2 because of previous jury duty, 1 excused for vacation, 1 excused for financial burden and 1 excused who was employed by the State's Attorney. Of the other 41 potential jurors, some 16 were due to prejudice, 2 because of knowing the victim or the victim's family and 14 due to adverse publicity. Hence, more than one-third of the jurors not excused for other reasons were excused for prejudice. Moreover, due to publicity essentially all other jurors had all heard and had knowledge concerning the facts of the case.

Here then a small farming community had been inundated by publicity concerning the accused and his apprehension, including editorials favorable to the prosecution and the sheriff in apprehending the accused. Under such circumstances it was erroneous for the trial court to refuse either to transfer the cause to another com-

---

[5] The editor of the paper, after testifying at the hearing, threatened the defense lawyer, causing him to be "in reasonable apprehension of physical danger." (C. 126-127) See Appendix D. Counsel's *fear,* as it affected his ability to represent defendant is additional reason why the court's denial of a continuance is erroneous.

munity or, in the alternative, delay trial until some of the recent publicity had subsided.

The prosecutor opposed a delay and the court apparently denied a continuance, because to continue the cause would have meant a trial in the summer and "it is very hard to have a jury trial in this courthouse, next to impossible, in the hot months because of lack of air conditioning." (Tr. 27, April 19, 1978)

Admittedly, effective prejudice from newspaper publicity must vary from community to community. However, the courts have become very cognizant that publicity which could be non-prejudicial in a large metropolitan community, is prejudicial in a small farming community. See *People v. Tidewell*, 89 Cal.Rptr. 444, 473 P.2d 748; *Beck v. Washington*, 369 U.S. 541 (1962). In *Beck*, the court distinguished the situation there from *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), on the basis that in *Irvin* the defendant was tried in a small town.

The court's statement in *Tidewell* is most applicable to the situation here.

> "Given the size of the Lassen County . . . the trial judge should have granted a change of venue when he was presented with a showing of pervasive new coverage of prosecution evidence and county-wide hostility toward the defense. The process of jury selection corroborated the defense affidavits, and should have resolved any possible doubts in favor of a venue change.
>
> *Although all of the jurors selected claimed the ability to sit impartially, such a claim is of course not conclusive 'No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its*

*father. Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight. As one of the jurors put it, "You can't forget what you hear and see.""* (Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 728, 31 S. Ct. 1639, 1645, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.)"

Here, in that this was a small town, and almost all of the prospective jurors had heard concerning the case, it was error not to either transfer the cause to another county or merely delay the trial. Failure to do so was error.

* * * * *

# APPENDIX C

* * * * *

## BRIEF AND ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

[Filed In The Appellate Court Of Illinois, Third District, By The State Appellate Defender]

## NATURE OF THE CASE

Edward Andrew Kimpel, III was indicted for murder. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on May 8, 1978 and the defendant was sentenced to serve a forty-year determinate term of imprisonment. This appeal is from the sentence imposed and the procedure used in sentencing. No issue is raised concerning the sufficiency of the indictment.

## ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether a judge must strike portions of a presentence report which contain unsubstantiated information which is prejudicial to the defendant after the defendant presents evidence refuting the accuracy of such information.

II. Whether due process requires that a trial judge must fully advise a defendant of the possible sentences, including the possibility of parole, under each of two separate sentencing statutes when the defendant has the right to elect sentencing under either statute.

## POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

**THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT WHICH CONTAINED UNSUBSTANTIATED INFORMATION PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE REFUTING SUCH INFORMATION.**

*People v. Crews*, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E. 2d 451 (1967);

*People v. Kirk*, 62 Ill. App. 3d 49, 378 N.E. 2d 795 (3d Dist. 1978);

*People v. Vaughn*, 56 Ill. App. 3d 700, 371 N.E. 2d 1248 (5th Dist. 1978);

*People v. Powell*, 27 Ill. App. 3d 834, 327 N.E. 2d 32 (2d Dist. 1975);

*Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1977);

*People v. Riley*, 376 Ill. 364, 33 N.E. 2d 872 (1941);

*People v. Gaines*, 21 Ill. App. 3d 839, 316 N.E. 2d 14 (1st Dist. 1974);

*People v. O'Neil*, 18 Ill. 2d 461, 165 N.E. 2d 319 (1960);

American Bar Association, *Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures*, §4.5(b).

II.

**WHERE A DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO ELECT SENTENCING UNDER ONE OF TWO DIFFERENT STATUTES, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE JUDGE FULLY ADVISE THE DEFENDANT ON THE POSSIBLE SENTENCES UNDER EACH, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE.**

*Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1977);

*People v. Crews*, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E. 2d 451 (1967);

*United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy*, 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953).

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

Edward A. Kimpel, III was indicted for the murder of Patricia Hull. Following a jury trial, he was convicted and sentenced to a forty year prison term. (R.134)*

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the Court requested a presentence investigation. (C.160-189) The investigation included a number of documents to which the defendant objected because they contained inaccurate information, were stale, hearsay in nature and released without the knowledge or consent of the defendant. (C.194-196) Among these were some psychological evaluations from the Patuxent Institute in Maryland dating back as far as twenty-two years. (R.9)

* Record page numbers refer to the transcript of the sentencing hearing.

The trial judge denied a motion to strike the contested information from the presentence investigation (R.7,95) The State presented no evidence in support of the accuracy of the contested information. Nor did the trial judge make a determination as to their accuracy.

The defendant testified and pointed out numerous inaccurate and prejudicial statements in the contested reports.

Since the defendant was convicted of a crime which occurred prior to February 1, 1978, he was given the option of being sentenced under either the old or new sentencing law. In advising the defendant of the possible sentence he might receive under each law, the trial judge informed him that there was no possibility of parole under the new law. (R.107) The judge, however, neglected to explain that early release through parole was possible under the old law. (R.109)

## ARGUMENT

I.

**THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT WHICH CONTAINED UNSUBSTANTIATED INFORMATION PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE DEFENDANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE REFUTING SUCH INFORMATION.**

When the accuracy of information considered in sentencing is materially denied, "it is incumbent upon the court to use care in determining the accuracy of the information." *People v. O'Neil*, 18 Ill. 2d 461, 165 N.E. 2d 319, 322 (1960).

The defendant moved to strike six documents, including several psychological evaluations from the Patuxent Institute in Maryland, from the presentence investigation submitted to the court. The motion alleged that these documents were hearsay, released without the authority of the defendant, and were too old to be relevant and too speculative and specious to be believed. (C.194-196) At the sentencing hearing, the defendant testified extensively as to material inaccuracies contained in the presentence report. The trial judge, nevertheless, refused to strike the disputed portions of the report and apparently relied upon the entire presentence investigation in sentencing the defendant to a maximum forty year prison term. (R.134)

Illinois case law mandates that a judge must determine the accuracy of any information relied upon in fixing punishment.

In *People v. Crews*, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E. 2d 451 (1967), the sentencing judge erred in considering the alleged statements of the defendant's 4½ year old son which were related to a Juvenile Division case-worker by the boy's foster mother. The defendant had been convicted of murdering her daughter. The case-worker's report included statements indicating other instances of alleged mistreatment of the daughter by the defendant. The State failed to call the defendant's son, the case-worker, or the foster mother to testify in support of the allegations in the case-worker's report.

In remanding the case for resentencing, the Court summarized Illinois law on the standard which applies to information considered in the sentencing decision.

> "Plainly, a judge with the solemn responsibility of determining the punishment of the convicted is to be encouraged to hear and consider all available

> and pertinent information concerning the person and the crime, so as to enable him to impose a punishment which is appropriate. *However, before relying on such information the judge must determine its accuracy* (cites omitted) *and he must take care to shield his mind from what might be the prejudicial effect of unreliable and other improper evidence.* (Cites omitted) *If it is shown that the convicted has been prejudiced by the procedure adopted, or material considered by the trial court in conducting its inquiry prior to the imposition of punishment, the resultant penalty will not be allowed to stand.* (Cites omitted) *People v. Crews*, 231 N.E. 2d at 454 (emphasis added)

*People v. Kirk*, 62 Ill. App. 3d 49, 378 N.E. 2d 795 (3d Dist. 1978) also recognized that a judge must determine the accuracy of information used in the sentencing process. In addition, *Kirk* discussed the use of psychological evaluations in sentencing. The Court found error in the use of such reports which contained references to past improper sexual conduct by a rape defendant. It was held improper to use these reports without having them supported by the testimony of the psychiatrists who prepared them or other competent witnesses.

In *People v. Powell*, 27 Ill. App. 3d 834, 327 N.E. 2d 32 (2d Dist. 1975), the Court remanded the case for resentencing because the sentencing judge relied heavily upon an 8½-year-old psychological report. See also *People v. Vaughn*, 56 Ill. App. 3d 700, 371 N.E. 2d 1248, 1252 (5th Dist. 1978) in which the Court described a 7-year-old psychological report as "extremely unreliable and improper evidence" at a sentencing hearing. Besides being seven years old, the report used in *Vaughn* contained no indication of the qualifications of the person who prepared the report or how much time he spent with the individual prisoners.

The case at bar presents numerous similarities with *Kirk*, *Powell* and *Vaughn*.

First, as in *Kirk*, the State failed to produce the authors of the defendant's psychological evaluations. There was no evidence to support the accuracy of the reports at all. To the contrary, the defendant testified as to a large number of material inaccuracies.

Second, as in *Powell* and *Vaughn*, the reports relied upon in the sentencing process were old. One of the defendant's evaluations dates back twenty-two years. Another is twenty years old and a third is nineteen years old. (R.9,34,44)

Third, the defendant testified that these three evaluations were based upon interviews spread over a three-year period which lasted approximately fifteen minutes each. (R.53) One of the examiners was not even a licensed psychologist. (R.9) As in *Vaughn*, this important information going to the accuracy of the evaluations could not be ascertained from the evaluations standing alone.

The psychological reports were highly prejudicial to the defendant. For example, the 1957 evaluation refers to the defendant's alleged "unconscious sadistic impulses", and concludes with the following statement: "The possibility appears good that he will tend to get into progressively greater difficulty with society for crimes which become progressively more aggressive and dangerous." (C.180, R.24, C.181, R.80) The 1959 evaluation speaks of a "crude and possibly violent emotional configuration" and concludes that the defendant "remains potentially capable of violent unpredictable behavior." (C.182, R.20, C.183, R.80) The 1960 evaluation alleges that Kimpel is "capable of violent destructive behavior on slight provocation." (C.184, R.80)

In addition to denying the truth of such allegations, the defendant pointed out that the annual psychological evaluations at the Patuxent Institute were conducted merely as a matter of form to block the yearly requests for release from the inmates. (R.53)

It is no answer to the prejudicial nature of these unsubstantiated reports to assume that the trial judge was not affected by them. The Court in *People v. Riley*, 376 Ill. 364, 33 N.E. 2d 872, 875 (1941) addressed this issue:

> "Obviously the trial judge owes the same duty to the defendant to protect his own mind from the possible prejudicial affect of incompetent evidence that he would owe in protecting a jury from the same contaminating influence."

*People v. Gaines*, 21 Ill. App. 3d 839, 316 N.E. 2d 14, 21 (1st Dist. 1974) and *People v. Crews*, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E. 2d 451, 454 (1967) also recognized that while strict rules of evidence do not apply in sentencing the Court must still "exercise care to assure the accuracy of information considered and shield itself from what might be the prejudicial effect of improper materials."

The United States Supreme Court has declared that sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding which must satisfy the requirements of due process. *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1977).

*Gardner* involved a death penalty case in which a portion of the presentence report was kept secret from the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that when the accuracy of a report is contested the trial judge can avoid delay by disregarding the disputed material. If the disputed material is, however, of critical importance, the Court should invest the time to ascertain the truth of its contents. 51 L.Ed. 2d at 403

The American Bar Association *Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures* suggest that the truth of disputed matter in a presentence investigation should be resolved by an informal evidentiary hearing where the issue is important to a proper sentence. ABA *Standards*, § 4.5, commentary to part (b).

The judge in the present case explicitly stated that the defendant's history of prior delinquency and criminal activity was an aggravating factor. (R.133) The history to which the judge referred was based upon the information in the presentence investigation. The finding of aggravation was undoubtedly based in part on the unsubstantiated and prejudicial information disputed by the defendant. There is no evidence that the judge disregarded this portion of the presentence report. To the contrary, the judge specifically denied a motion to strike the disputed portions and reiterated the denial even after the defendant testified as to inaccuracies and the State presented no supporting evidence. (R.7,95)

Under these circumstances, it is the duty of the sentencing judge to determine the accuracy of the contested facts or else to strike that portion from the presentence report. Admission of the disputed portions in this case denied the defendant's due process right to a fair sentencing hearing.

As the Court recognized in *People v. Crews*, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E. 2d 451 (1967), when it is shown that the convicted has been prejudiced by material considered by the trial court in sentencing, the resultant penalty will not be allowed to stand.

The unsubstantiated material considered at the sentencing hearing in this case was clearly prejudicial to the defendant. Due process requires that he be given a

new sentencing hearing untainted by an unverified and prejudicial presentence report.

II.

**WHERE A DEFENDANT HAS THE RIGHT TO ELECT SENTENCING UNDER ONE OF TWO DIFFERENT STATUTES, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE JUDGE FULLY ADVISE THE DEFENDANT OF THE POSSIBLE SENTENCES UNDER EACH, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE.**

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the sentencing process as well as the trial itself must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1977)

The defendant in this case was convicted of a crime which occurred prior to February 1, 1978. As the trial judge correctly observed, the defendant was, therefore, entitled to elect sentencing under either the new law (Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, §1005-8-1(a)(1)) or the previous sentencing statute. (R.106) The defendant elected the new law and received a maximum forty-year sentence with no possibility of parole. (R.134)

In deciding which sentencing option to choose, it was essential to the defendant for the judge to fully advise him as to the possible sentences under each alternative. The judge failed to do this and thereby violated the defendant's right to due process of law.

The trial judge advised the defendant that there was no possibility of parole under the new law. (R. 107) In advising the defendant of the old law, however, the judge made no reference to parole except to state that a three-year period of mandatory parole is required upon release. (R.109) The judge failed to tell the defendant

that early release via parole is possible under the old law. This omission deprived the defendant of the opportunity to make an informed decision.

Due process requires that "essential fairness" must prevail in sentencing procedures. *United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy*, 204 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1953). It has also been recognized that sentencing is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) It is clear, therefore, that due process requires a judge at a sentencing proceeding to completely inform the defendant of available sentencing alternatives.

Where a defendant is prejudiced by a sentencing procedure, the resultant penalty cannot stand. *People v. Crews*, 38 Ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E. 2d 451 (1967) In this case, the defendant was prejudiced by the judge's failure to inform him that parole was available under the old sentencing law. This failure to fully advise the defendant was in violation of due process and requires that the defendant's sentence be vacated and a new sentencing hearing held.

## CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the defendant requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing.

* * * * *

# APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

STATE OF ILLINOIS
Supreme Court—ss.

* * * * *

BE IT REMEMBERED, that, to-wit: on the 29th day of May, 1980, the same being one of the days of the term of Court aforesaid, the following proceedings were, by said Court, had and entered of record, to-wit:

---

PEOPLE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

*Respondent,*

No. 52996 *vs.*

EDWARD ANDREW KIMPEL, III,

*Petitioner.*

---

Petition for Leave to Appeal from
Appellate Court, Third District,
78-349, 77 CF 22.

---

And now on this day the Court having duly considered the Petition for Leave to Appeal herein and being now fully advised of and concerning the premises, doth overrule the prayer of the petition and denies Leave to Appeal herein.

I, CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois and keeper of the records, files and Seal thereof, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the final order of the said Supreme Court in the above entitled cause of record in my office.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed the Seal of said Court this 23rd day of June, 1980.

/s/ CLELL L. WOODS, Clerk,
Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.